The Russian Federation played a crucial role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, after the US decision not to comply with the treaty, its ratification turned out to be indispensable for the Protocol to become legally binding. In early 2002, the Russian government decided to initiate the ratification process. However, notwithstanding this initial commitment, the country long hesitated to fulfil its promises, and for the last two years it sent numerous contradictory signals with respect to its position on climate policy. As a consequence, the factors that shape Russia's behaviour in the context of climate negotiations received increasing attention. The main focus has been on the economic and international aspects motivating the Russian strategy. This paper attempts to complete this analysis by concentrating on a further feature that significantly contributed to Russia's final decision, namely domestic forces. These factors have often been overlooked in the discussion of the Russian strategy. In order to fill this gap, this paper reconstructs the Russian ratification process, trying to identify the main domestic players and their role. Our findings provide various indications on the reasons of the recent developments in Russia, confirming the key role of the Russian President. the ratification. Finally, the paper examines the media sector, concentrating on its role in the negotiation process.
INTRODUCTION
The Russian Federation has played a crucial role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. A precondition for making the agreement legally binding is that at least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing at least 55% of the 1990 carbon dioxide emissions in industrialised countries, must have ratified the Protocol. After the US decided to withdraw from the treaty, with its 17% share of emissions Russia has held the key to Kyoto for a long while.
Although the decision by the government to start the process of ratification for the Kyoto climate treaty goes back to April 11 th , 2002, Russia has long hesitated to fulfil it. Indeed, the last two year-period has been characterised by a number of contradictory signals. However, a series of international agreements has been signed, whose adoption was predicted to have a positive repercussion on the signing of Kyoto. Finally, the recent approval of the treaty by the lower House of Parliament and a bill signed by President Putin have been internationally welcomed as the last move preceding the Protocol's entry into force.
Several studies have been conducted to assess the factors that shape Russian behaviour in climate negotiations. The economic implications of the Protocol's ratification for the country have been analysed in order to define the incentives to participate in the treaty. Other approaches have focused on concessions in international policy areas, like the support for WTO membership, as the main goals in Russian brinkmanship strategy.
One hypothesis is based on a costs and benefits analysis and the other refers to the consequences of the bargaining strategy of Russia. Together, they represent the economic and the international sides of the ratification process. Both of the approaches provide key elements to understanding Russian reluctance to adopt the Kyoto framework. To enrich the picture, however, a further factor must be added, namely domestic forces which have contributed importantly to the fate of the Protocol. This paper focuses on these internal factors. After a detailed reconstruction of the Russian ratification process, this work separately considers the main domestic actors and their role in it. The country's political system is analysed through its ambiguities, inherited by the collapse of the former regime, and its recent controversial reform, undertaken by President Putin. It is argued that the apparent antagonism within and between governmental departments, together with the redundant number of institutions in charge of environmental protection, have impacted the Kyoto Protocol adoption process.
The large and unstable energy sector is taken into consideration for its interactions with political power.
The paper will also discuss the federal government response to what it considers to be a threat represented by the treaty's potential benefits to the industry. A further section centres on the Russian environmental non-governmental organizations. While lacking strong national support and public involvement, NGOs operating on environment protection are numerous and represent one of the voices most clearly in favour of was asked to improve the submission. Before this bureaucratic act, however, the Russian government had twice expressed its commitment in a brief ratification process. In the concluding statement of the ninth EU-Russia Summit on the May 29 th 2002, it was emphasized that the "environmental aspects of the Russia-EU relations are taking concrete shape […] We will make every necessary effort to ensure that the Kyoto Protocol becomes a real tool for solving the problems of global warming as soon as possible" 1 . Moreover, during the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in September 2002, Russia officially reiterated its commitment to ratification. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced that Moscow hoped to adopt the Kyoto Protocol "in the very near future" 2 .
On the same day, the Russian newspaper Pravda reported a statement of the then-Deputy minister of Economic Development and Trade of Russia, Mohammed Tsikanov, affirming that "'Russia is losing economic reasons to ratify the Kyoto Protocol" because of the impact of the US position at the WSSD talks on Russia's "ability to negotiate the quota of emissions" 3 . While having at that time represented a political act without precedent, double and contradicting announcements were bound to become a constant in the Given the seemingly favourable context, many observers expected that the Putin government would issue papers for the Duma to start preparing a law on ratification. However, addressing the Moscow Conference on Climate Change, the Russian president visibly avoided offering any commitments on the Kyoto Protocol. He said that "Russia stands for the quickest possible ratification" of Kyoto, but then affirmed that 1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_02/state.htm 2 http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/636/93/PDF/N0263693.pdf?OpenElement 3 http://english.pravda.ru/politics/2002/09/03/35910.html there were still "difficult and unclear problems" 5 . He joked that global warming might be good for frigid Russia 6 .
The government's declaration contradicted Putin's chief economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, who predicted a few days earlier that Russia would not ratify the Protocol. In a presentation headed "The Kyoto Protocol is discriminatory against Russia", Illarionov swept aside arguments that Russia would benefit economically from ratification through its ability to sell emission credits to other countries. He warned that strong projected economic growth and the likelihood of stronger emission curbs later turn Russia into a buyer rather than a seller of credits. He also presented ten questions, which were answered by members of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) attending the conference. In a second speech Illarionov claimed that he was totally unconvinced by responses 7 .
The Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (the highest institution established by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) held in Milan in December of 2003 provided the stage for a surprisingly similar episode. On Tuesday December 4 rt the international media reported Andrei Illarionov saying that Russia would withdrawal from the Protocol because it would slow economic growth 8 . In a hurriedly organized news conference that was called to offset the impression left by Putin's adviser's comments, a few hours later Minister for Economic Development and Trade Tsikanov said that "there are no decisions about ratification of the Kyoto Protocol except that we are moving toward ratification" 9 . A diplomatic incident nearly occurred on Thursday 6 th when Illarionov said that he was speaking for President Vladimir Putin when he rejected the Kyoto pact, adding that the Deputy Economy Minister who contradicted him was mistaken: "the statement was made physically by me, but the words I was using were those of the Russian President" 10 .
The Russians' ambiguous stance on ratification had not changed even in the months that preceded the meeting in Milan. While repeating his good will in several international occasions (as in the October 19 th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Bangkok,), Putin did not miss any opportunities to sit at the negotiating Putin said to journalists that he was determined to ratify but problems would rather lay with Duma 12 .
Many observers saw the victory of the presidential party as an encouraging signal: the opposing wing being cut off, they argued, should have accelerated ratification after the presidential elections. Last December's parliamentary election gave near total control of the Duma and its committees to the pro-Kremlin United Russia party. This, together with Putin's landslide victory in the Presidential elections on March 14 th , meant that ratification of Kyoto was in Putin's hands.
Despite this seemingly clear cut political context, however, Russia's government and Parliament looked to be headed for a collision on April 15 th , with key Duma committees rejecting the Protocol and one major ministry speaking out in favour of the environmental treaty. Some economic ministers had already backed the pact, and the addition of the influential Minister of Industry and Energy to their number appeared to be a move torwards forming a single government position. Viktor Borisovich Khristenko prepared a report for Putin (who last October ordered state bodies to report on Kyoto before the Kremlin ruled on the issue by May 20) arguing that the protocol poses not threat to Russian economy. The Ministry said that even if Russia's economic growth remains at the level of 8% a year, the average level of greenhouse gas emissions in 2008-2012 will still be 15% less than the level determined for Russia in the Kyoto Protocol.
During the State Duma Parliament hearing "On Problems related with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol", which took place the same day, a group of committees concluded that "ratification is inexpedient given the US pullout and the non-participation of many countries with high levels of man-made impact on climatic processes". The hearing was conducted on the initiative of the Committee on Ecology in cooperation with the Committee on Economic Policy, Business and Tourism and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. According to Reuters, several deputies were clearly uncomfortable about making a decision without guidance from higher authorities and an official presidential position or an official government position 13 . Greenpeace defined the hearing "a great defeat" of the Kyoto opponents 14 . Protocol" 18 . The premise of accelerating the process, however, was the clearest statement on the subject:
again President referred to the Duma's crucial role in the process.
Analysts commented that presidential economic advisor Illarionov's public resistance 19 (in April he told reporters in St. Petersburg that the Kyoto Protocol can be called an international Auschwitz) might have been aimed at improving Russia's bargaining position in its bid to join the World Trade Organization. In the following days, several EU ministers admitted they have given in to Russia's position that the Kyoto Protocol is connected to other EU-Russia issues, although they denied any direct links 20 .
Positive expectations regarding an imminent ratification were strengthened by the draft of the Russian government report to be submitted to the Prime Minister on May 20 th . It said that Russia's emissions would not exceed its Kyoto target in the first commitment period, that the Protocol would not be damaging to Russian economy, and might be potentially beneficial to the Russian energy sector. However, the day before, the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) issued a statement denouncing Kyoto Protocol as lacking scientific foundation and dangerous to National interests. Although the RAN had already expressed this opinion in 2003 and although the view of the mastermind behind the statement, academician Yuri Israel, has been known for a long time, it is difficult to ignore the RAN's resolution since Putin has asked both the Academy and the Government to formulate their views.
One more controversial exchange, then, that follows one more prediction about ratification. The tenth Conference of the Parties (COP-10) to the UNFCCC will take place in Buenos Aires in December. A voice as influential as that of the head of the UN Environmental Program Klaus Töpfer stated twice in a week last June that Russia will formally announce its ratification during the summit. In the light of the latest treaty on WTO accession, many observers agree that ratification is closer than ever.
Nevertheless, Russian presidential economic advisor Andrei Illarionov continued its anti-Kyoto campaign in the beginning of July at a Moscow press conference, calling the Kyoto Protocol according to Interfax an "undeclared war against Russia" 21 . However, perhaps more importantly, he did no longer rule out the possibility that Russia will ratify: "If this decision is approved, it won't be on the basis of a substantial analysis, and not for substantial reasons, but for other reasons. We can't completely rule this out." Indeed, after President Putin's promise to speed up the ratification process, the positive signs towards Kyoto multiplied. Indeed, the support for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol seemed to be growing in Russia, and the signs were more positive than ever. In particular, Benedikt von Butler, the trading director for 18 Still, the Kyoto opponents strengthened their efforts to stop the progress of these developments. This has been confirmed at the end of June by Russia's e-daily Ros Business Consulting (RBC) that stressed, based on statements of the local research group "Russia and Kyoto Protocol", that Russia can benefit from Kyoto only if it is guaranteed sales of 100-130 million tonnes of CO2e at a price of no less than 40 dollars per tonne. 23 The subsequent period was characterized by intense internal debates on the weaknesses and strengths of the Kyoto Protocol, accumulating in negative signals observed by Reuters in the first week of September.
According to a draft report, signed by the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko, scepticism towards Kyoto has been revealed, claiming that it "is ineffective for resolving the main duty of the convention -stabilizing greenhouse has concentration". However, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stressed immediately that Russia still intended to approve the Kyoto Protocol, despite the official papers suggesting the Government was turning against it. Russian officials thus continued to be apparently split on the issue of Kyoto.
On September 22, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) reported that the Russian President Putin has instructed key ministers to sign the Kyoto ratification documents. Although this has not immediately been confirmed by Russian government sources, in the days after this announcement the real movement in the Russian ratification process has been underpinned. Indeed, the issuing of ratification documents by the Kremlin has been confirmed as both the Russian Natural Resources Ministry Yury Trutnev and the Russian Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref signed President Putin's package of ratification documents for the Kyoto Protocol.
As expected, Russia's anti-Kyoto lobby did not lose time to react to President Putin's obvious step towards ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Putin's economic adviser Andrei Illarionov was quoted by RIA Novosti to compare the Protocol to "fascism" 24 , while the head of the lobby group Russia and the Kyoto Protocol Anna Kashirova told journalists the decision to ratify had still not been made.
However, on September 28 th , Russia's strongest Kyoto opponent, Andrei Illarionov, stated for the first time that he believes in Russia's close ratification. In particular, the Moscow Times quoted him saying that Russia will ratify due to a purely political calculation in a "gesture toward the European Union".
Illarionov's statement has been interpreted as evidence for a near decision by Russian authorities. 22 Reported by Wall Street Journal on June 2 nd , 2004, in http://www.afr.com/articles/2004/06/01/1086058850473.html 23 According to an analyst of this group only guaranteed annual carbon sales of 5 billion USD over 10-12 years can justify Russia's accession to the Kyoto Protocol. 24 http://www.mosnews.com/money/2004/09/27/illarionovkyoto.shtml Indeed, the day after, numerous reports, all based on the Russian news agency Itar-Tass, strengthened the expectation that Russia was convinced that the correct political moment to ratify Kyoto has arrived. On September 30 th 2004, the Russian government has approved the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and sent it to parliament for ratification. 25 The decision by the parliament, whose approval is necessary for the treaty's ratification, was expected to take place within the next weeks and was in general considered as a mere formality. In fact, after Russia's move has world-wide been welcomed as an important step in opening the way for the Kyoto Protocol's entry-into force, on October 12 th President Putin unambiguously backed the Kyoto Protocol in his first public comments since his government sent it to the State Duma for ratification. 26 
ANALYSIS: INTERNAL FORCES
Since the statement of the then Prime Minister Kasyanov at the World Summit on Sustainable Development on September 3 rd 2002, signals regarding Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol have been increasingly conflicting and nebulous. Some of the reasons undoubtedly lie in economics. In several occasions Putin has made it clear that Russia will make its decision based on Moscow's economic and foreign policy goals, and how they correspond to the "emission trading regime" allowed for in the Protocol. By creating a new market niche for emission trading, Russia will be able to gain from the surplus of emission rights that it is supposed to have under Kyoto's first reduction commitment period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , due to post-Soviet industrial collapse. Besides selling its own reduction credits, as a signatory country, Russia will also be able to acquire "emission reduction units" by financing projects reducing greenhouse gas emissions in other developed countries through a mechanism known as "joint implementation". On the contrary, opponents state that Russia will soon exceed its emissions limits, and will then have to introduce costly measures for emission reductions, stymieing its own GPD growth.
A further key factor in understanding the tortuousness of the process toward ratification are domestic pressures operating at various levels. Interactions among different Russian institutions, big business, nongovernmental players, public opinion (although this may be disputable) need to be taken into consideration in order to gain a holistic picture. After having briefly examined the chronology of events, this paper moves to focus the way internal forces have impacted the course of the Russian adoption of the Protocol and continue to do so today.
Russian governmental authorities

Legislative branch
The Russian legislative branch is shaped by a bicameral Federal Assembly (or Federalnoye Sobraniye), which consists of the Federation Council (or Sovet Federatsii 30 ) and the State Duma (or Gosudarstvennaya Duma 31 ). During last December's lower chamber election, the relative majority of vote went to United Russia party (37,1%), granting this pro-Putin party 222 seats in the Parliament. This, together with the 71,2 percent of vote that Vladimir Putin obtained in the last presidential election (March 14 th 2004), means that the ratification bill is virtually guaranteed a smooth passage through the Parliament. In fact, the recent approval of the treaty by the Duma meant that the final ratification by Putin would have simply been a matter of time.
While hearings on the ratification such as that of April 2004 may have enhanced the understanding of the issues involved within the Duma, their main role could have been to air different views on ratification to the outside world and establish the terms of the agreement. Bobo Lo, an eminent American scholar of Russian history, argues that such a tactic was used after September 11 th , when Putin succeeded in positioning Russia as an ally for United States, while allowing the Duma to spell out what Russia expected in return 32 . 29 Reported by Associate Press, see http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/R/RUSSIA_KYOTO_PROTOCOL?SITE=WAOLY&SECTION=HOME&TEM PLATE=DEFAULT 30 178 seats; as of July 2000, members appointed by the top executive and legislative officials in each of the 89 federal administrative units -oblasts, krays, republics, autonomous okrugs and oblasts, and the federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg; members serve four-year terms. This, like all the administrative information that follow, are available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html 31 450 seats; 225 seats elected by proportional representation from party lists winning at least 5% of the vote, and 225 seats from single-member constituencies; members are elected by direct, popular vote to serve four-year terms 32 BO L., Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Chatham House Papers, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003 
Executive branch
As shown above, controversial statements over ratification have been fed by apparent antagonism within and between governmental departments. Although a public show of debate between different officials is normal, the different positions reflected by the press have been interpreted as a reflection of the embedded interest of departments and individuals 33 The interagency status of the commission limits its role to designing climate change mitigation programs and coordinating work among the participating agencies. For example, several ministries simultaneously work on programs such as joint implementation and monitoring. The commission made suggestions about dividing work on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, but a formal decision about this has not been made so far. Jurisdictional issues occasionally arise on who should be responsible for implementing flexible mechanisms. Representatives from the Ministry for Energy and the Ministry for Economics consider their agencies to be responsible for issuing permits in a domestic or international system 36 .
The Commission has not formally met for several years, even though all international climate change documents require its approval. In reality, the Commission functions as a part of Hydromet, which is ineffective because Hydromet has no responsibility for the economy or for the energy sector 37 . Leading Hydromet figures are known to oppose Kyoto and even to have concluded that climate change would be beneficial to Russia.
In spite of the fact that the effects on the Kyoto Protocol are not yet apparent, the reform of the However, all their activities are the reserve of the federal ministries' staff headed by Dmitry Kozak. Under the Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zhukov the ministries will be totally different from those under his predecessor Mikhail Kasyanov. They will be responsible for issuing resolutions and orders on jurisdictional questions. However, they no longer have the right to make specific decisions, e.g., on issuing a license for a particular type of activity.
We will not question Vladimir Putin's desire to make executive power in Russia more effective. Nevertheless, the fact that the government was reorganized a week before the presidential elections and the very strange circumstances of Mikhail Kasyanov's dismissal suggest that what happened was less an action of the president than part of a presidential candidate's election campaign. The campaign itself, whose results at the time this issue of Dengi appeared in print will be better known to readers than to the author, was unusual. For the first time in Russia's history, the country's population was not voting for the head of state, who will 36 Ibidem 37 http://www.pnl.gov/aisu/pubs/russkyoto.pdf probably be Vladimir Putin by a wide margin, but for the people he believes will bring him absolute victory […] . It looks as if the structural reform of the government that president and presidential candidate Vladimir Putin put into effect several days before the elections was not just a preelection ploy. To all appearances, a real administrative revolution took place in the country. At the same time, the government's effectiveness in its new form will show whether Russia needs a presidential regime with unlimited powers. However, having become a real rival for presidential power, the new government has signed its own death warrant 38 .
Although so far it is not clear what was the impact of this reform on the ratification process, it could be argued that it determined a more coherent approach to the issue.
Administrative divisions
The new Russian Constitution (which came into force on 12 th December 1993) established considerable powers for the federal executive and left the division of powers between centre and periphery purposefully ambiguous. Soon after the referendum that narrowly ratified his Constitution, Russia's first president Boris
Yeltsin launched a trend that patently contradicted the official paper just signed.
Signing treaties (dogovory) and agreeements (soglasheniya) with the executive heads of ethnic republics (and soon after with oblasts and krais), Yeltsin eroded the legal equality his Constitution proclaimed for different levels of centreperiphery relations. Savvy regional negotiators won budget privileges, powers of appointment, exemption from various federal requirements, and a tacit understanding that federal officials -at least for the time being -would look away from glaring violations of the federal Constitution and basic democratic principles 39 .
Yeltsin's treaties were never ratified by legislatures; their ambiguous enforceability was made clear by the new president Putin, who showed clear disregard for executive promises that no longer suited his interests.
One of Putin's first presidential decrees, signed days after his inauguration, divided Russia into seven federal districts, each encompassing 49 oblast, 21 republics, 10 okrug, (each headed by a presidential enforcer tasked to maintain the supremacy of federal law), 6 krai, 2 federal cities and 1 autonomous oblast.
Putin described his project as the "dictatorship of law" 40 .
The management of natural resources and the environment falls under Article 72 of the Russian Constitution, and hence under the joint jurisdiction of federal and regional authorities. According to Article 76 of the Constitution, federal law has priority over regional law in areas of joint jurisdiction, but the regional authorities nevertheless enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre. "First, federal legislation is still poorly developed , and it become difficult for federal authorities to change a practice that for years has been followed in accordance with regional legislation. Second, there is an almost unlimited number of approaches to an area of law, and Article 76 refers only to instances of direct contradiction between legislation of the two levels" 41 . In addition to this is the fact that individual bilateral agreements have again come to fill the legal vacuum between the federal centre and more than half of the subjects of the Russian Federation.
Given this context, it is not surprising that regional support and cooperation are crucial to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, not only do regions account for a significant share of greenhouse gas emissions and are thus candidates for potential projects, but they also have an important role in GHG inventories and data collection. Regional emission data was reported to be compatible with state level data and Russian experts emphasized that the Kyoto mechanisms could provide a useful tool for companies in the regions to attract modern environmental technology 42 According to International Herald Tribune, three-quarters of regional governors are in favour of Kyoto and are competing to bring European investors to their regions 44 . Some Russian regions have been actively preparing their participation in the Kyoto activities. For instance in the Archangelsk region in North-West Russia the regional administration has been cooperating with energy saving and environmental investment agencies in order to improve the attractiveness of implementing Kyoto mechanisms in the region.
Arkhangelsk region is currently importing coal and oil products for its energy-intensive wood processing and pulp and paper industries from other regions. Therefore, the Kyoto-related focus areas of Arkhangelsk have much potential for energy saving and renewable energy 45 . The cooperation between regional administration and environmental agencies has initiated a regional GHG inventory and spread information about the Kyoto process to the local industrial actors. 41 HØNNELAND G. -JØRGENSEN A-K., "Implementing Russia's International Environmental Commitments: Federal Prerogative or Regional Concern?", in Europe-Asia Studies, 54 (2002) A potential source of controversy is that of property rights, which the federal government regards as its prerogative, while the regions believe that they should belong to them. This line of conflict runs between the federal and the regional levels in general, especially after the introduction of various measures that may curb governors and the regional Duma's authority.
While lying outside this work's aims, it could be argued that these sets of questions, and other potential conflicts, reflect the general picture of the Russian political institutions. Arisen as a result of the political struggle, the Russian presidential system has been defined " a response to the legacy of the Communist Party […]; the presidency was a completely new institution in Russia's political tradition, but still […] it led back to the autocratic tradition" 46 . The nature of political power in Russia, "which is democratic in its form and authoritarian in its essence, is never strong" 47 : Parliament legislates, but the president can rule by decree in areas where the law is silent. The president can veto acts of parliament; the parliament can stymie presidential decrees by passing laws which oppose it, and if the president vetoes such a law, a two-thirds majority of both legislative chambers can override this veto. Although the 178-member Federation Council expressly represents regional interests, the president can unilaterally overturn regional acts and laws in his role as "protector of the constitution" 48 .
Several of these lines of conflict come into play in the Kyoto Protocol implementation process. Moreover, according to two scholars who studied national-level political processes following international environmental agreements, there is one more actor to be taken into consideration: industry enterprises. "As the Soviet system for implementation of the country's international environmental obligations (led by the interdepartmental commission) disintegrated, as the federal environmental agency gradually lost its authority [see par. 2], and as the public authorities increasingly lost control of industry enterprises, the enterprises themselves became more important actors in the Russian implementation game" 49 .
Energy Producers
In 2003, Russia's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 7.3%, surpassing average growth rates in all other G8 countries, and marking the country's fifth consecutive year of economic expansion. Russia's economic growth over the last five years has been sustained primarily by energy exports, particularly given the boom in Russian oil production and relatively high world oil prices during this period. But this type of growth has made the Russian economy dangerously dependent on oil and natural gas exports, and especially vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices. The Russian government has made multiplying economic growth from commodity exports a priority, and is attempting to restructure and liberalize its energy sector. These reforms have come at the behest of both Russian oil and natural gas producers, who are seeking to grow in a more liberalized marketplace. Russia's external trading partners are also pressuring the country to synchronize their policies with those in Western Europe and North America, particularly vis-a-vis Russia's aspiration towards the World Trade Organization (WTO). Breaking up the monopolies that control the natural gas and electricity industries would be the key factor.
In the meantime, however, the Kremlin has shown a tendency to advance the state's influence in the energy sector, not to reduce it. In spite of its break-up during the 1990s, in fact, the energy industry as a whole remains State dominated.
Over the past six months, the Russian Energy Ministry (now known as the CNN quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin defining the case as part of his "crackdown on corruption" 54 and denies any political motives. Khodorkovsky's supporters say the trial is part of a Kremlin effort to halt the former oilman's political aspirations and to send a message to other "oligarchs" to tow the line.
The Russian gas industry is dominated by Gazprom, the state-run natural gas monopoly. Single-handedly, Gazprom holds 25% of world gas reserves and controls 90% of Russian gas output. It is Russia's largest earner of hard currency (with 60% of these earnings generated through sales to Europe). Its payments account for around 20% of federal budget tax revenues 55 . However, unlike the Russian oil industry, 51 See PEREGUDOV S., "The Oligarchical Model of Russian Corporatism", in BROWN A., Contemporary Russian Politics 52 According to a paper published by the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, "some companies take their direction from the State, such as Zarubezneft, which functions more or less as an arm of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Others, like Rosneft and Slavnet, in spite of their majority State-ownership try to straddle political and commercial imperatives by fighting continuous battles with the government bureaucracy to operate as independently as possible but still access investment capital from State sources. While other private companies, such as YUKOS and LUKoil, with commercial market-driven business investment strategies, continue to be strongly influenced by the State". In HILL F. -FEE F., "Fueling the Future: The Prospects for Russian Oil and Gas", in Demokratizatsiya, 10 (2002) The Russian government has recognized this problem and has been gradually increasing the price for natural gas domestically.
Although the Russian State's stake in Gazprom is technically only 38%, the government is the largest shareholder in the company and Gazprom is also one of Moscow's main foreign policy tools. The close linkages between the Russian government and the company are considered clear by Russian political commentators 56 .
As with similar patterns in oil and natural gas, Russia's power sector was stunted by the economic slowdown which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, electricity generation has shown both a dramatic decline (down 18% between 1992 and 1999), and a gradual recovery (up 8% between 1999 and 2002) . A 1992 Presidential decree restructured the sector into a single joint-stock company, RAO UES (Unified Energy Sector), and established the company Rosenergoatom to operate all nuclear power stations. In 2003, the Dutch government proposed UES to fund the modernisation of a power plant in Amursk, Khabarovsk region, as an investment in a joint implementation project. The Russian authorities, however, did not give their approval, leaving UES out of a 10 million euros deal and with an antiquated power plant.
The lack of the necessary Letter of Approval from the Russian government may be indicative of Russian caution over signing anything that could be regarded as a political commitment to deliver ratification, but it may also reflect government resistance to business JI initiatives at this stage.
UES is not the only Russian business that supports the Kyoto ratification. Companies such as Gazprom and
LUKoil, which, as told below, have partnerships with European energy firms, are also keen to maintain a "green" image. Overall, business is trying to move the debate away from politics toward practical implementation 61 . In 2003, for instance, Gazprom already had a JI pilot project with the German Ruhrgas, aimed at converting an old coal power station to gas. It was turned down as it was not accompanied by the Letter of Approval from the government 62 .
Taking into consideration the energy sector opens a new perspective on the Kyoto Protocol process of ratification. The past government's stalling seems to be consistent with the analysed Kremlin pattern in reforming the energy industry and clenching governmental control over numerous spheres of public life.
The treaty's potential benefits to the Russian energy sector could be so large that the Kyoto Protocol is likely to be seen by the federal government as a tool which may further empower business. Putin seems to be aware of the political influence of big business and then actively seeking to keep it under the government's control. 58 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html 59 Quoted by The Moscow Times, in http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/06/09/002-print.html 60 The Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender (ERUPT) is mandated by the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs as an instrument for the Dutch government to buy carbon credits for joint implementation credits. 61 In this sense, a relevant initiative is the National Carbon Union, a non-commercial partnership of the largest Russian corporations, responsible for a significant part of industrial greenhouse gas emissions in Russia and realising investment opportunities of practical using of the Kyoto protocol to attract investments in modernisation of Russian industrial complexes projects. The partnership is interested in implementing of UNFCCC regulations, using the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms with the purpose to decrease harmful anthropogenous influence on the environment and the planet climate and organising of an international cooperation in realisation of large-scale investments projects in Russia
Environmental NGOs
As the largest country on Earth, Russia accounts for more than 10% of the world's total land area, and is richly endowed with energy, mineral, water and forest resources. However Russia is still paying the legacy of cross-border contamination from the Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine. They also have plans to earn hard currency by importing nuclear waste from other countries (which will sum to the wastes from the military complex and the country's own 30 operating commercial reactors) and continue to possess an abundance of pollution from what are now outdated industrial enterprises that lack the funds to clean up.
Finally, as it has been said above, on the climate change front Russia is the second or third largest emitter of greenhouse gases, although it also is a large potential long-term "carbon sink" because of its vast forest reserves.
Since the early 1990s, western institutions have provided more than 1 As for the international commitment, WWF Russia is one of the Russian largest independent conservation organization involved in global projects, and one of the most active supporters of the Kyoto Protocol.
Through its press office 65 and the statements and reports of its authoritative coordinator of the Russian Climate Program, Alexey Kokorin, reported by national and international media, WWF plays a crucial role in coordinating the environmental pro-Kyoto pressure.
In a brochure that first appeared in April 2003, the WWF analysed the framework of the preparation process of ratification and discussed information and facts commonly associated with the Protocol. A few months later, the first brochure was followed by a second edition, which reiterated the arguments put forward in the previous edition and contained answers to many more recent questions 66 Russia may benefit from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, but Russia needs to ratify the Protocol in the first place. If Russia fails to do so, it will lose any subsequent benefits and its positive reputation in the international political arena.
Russia will also suffer a negative reaction from potential investors, while its economic competitors will get a competitive advantage. Russia will lose a lot of available foreign investment opportunities.
At the same time, the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol will not accrue automatically.
Active measures will be needed, such as development and implementation of a strong national policy and implementation program, as well as optimal utilization of flexibility mechanism provided by the Protocol. Russia will need to conduct an active international and domestic policy of industrial restructuring 67 .
A desire for a better environment is widely supported in abstract. In a survey in Russia between 1993 and 2001, respondents were asked questions that were likely to be of real significance to individuals and were intended to estimate their willingness to trade-off the environment against specific material outcomes 68 . The first question asked people to decide whether they valued job security even if it meant continuing pollution -a potentially important issue at a time when unemployment was increasing. The second question asked respondents whether they would be willing to support environmental policies even if this led to falling living standards, again a relevant concern when living standards were falling.
The results show considerable differences of opinion across respondents. What is notable in general, however, is the extent of support for environmental protection even given the relevant costs that respondents were asked to take into account. Taking all the surveys together, no more than 47% of the respondents answered that it was important to preserve people's job even if it meant keeping polluting enterprises open. And fully 65% disagreed with the proposition that people should have higher incomes even if this resulted in damage to the environment.
The survey's results account for a country that believes that pollution exists and could be a problem.
However, although the environment has long been an area of permissible dissent, according to a WWF Russia analysis the wider public is generally more concerned with domestic problems than international affairs 69 . Environmental policymaking appears fragmented and, as it has been shown in the previous pages, many of the institutions responsible for it are unstable. Russian NGOs may have a particularly prominent role in the reconnection of the public interest in sustainable development to government priorities for environmental protection. 67 Ibidem p. 15 68 WHITEFIELD S., "Russian mass attitudes towards the environment", in Post Soviet Affairs, 19 (2003) 2 However, Russian NGOs who work on environmental issues have traditionally been distant from the public and the communities in which they work. The leaders and members of these NGOs are often scientists, technical experts, and other professionals who tend to value their links to the scientific community, but who may not be inclined to consult "ordinary citizens." Indeed, a 2002 survey of Russian environmental NGOs found that 70 percent of these groups routinely consult with scientists to advance their work, while only 30 percent routinely seek involvement from the public 70 .
The survey also found that most environmental NGOs do not work with other Russian or international NGOs on a regular basis. They consult even less frequently with anyone in local government. Weakest of all is their relationship with the private sector. Ninety-two percent of NGOs surveyed reported working with business or industry only "occasionally" or "never". The absence of close working relations with these groups means that Russian environmental NGOs often lack an effective entry point to decision-making 71 .
The problem of civic disengagement goes beyond the NGO community. Many Russian citizens do not actively seek to participate in environmental NGOs or in the political process. This is not due to any legal constraint on public participation. Russians have a constitutional and statutory right to participate in public decision-making and to give their input on environmental matters. Yet, a recent poll indicates that only 5 percent of Russians currently participate in public organizations and nearly 75 percent say they have no interest in doing so 72 .
These results point to the difficulty of building coalitions for action around environmental problems in Russia today. The only exception is related with the public concern about the role of the environment in health issues. Nearly 60 percent of 3,300 Russians surveyed in 2000 reported that they believed the environment caused or contributed to chronic illnesses in their family 73 . If it can be tapped, this concern may offer a viable path to public engagement.
Russian NGOs are clearly starting to understand the need to involve the public in their work. More than 40 percent of environmental NGOs now rank "increased public involvement" as a top priority for improving environmental policies 74 . This means facing the challenge of attracting public attention, exploiting the most efficient means for this goal. Green organizations are thus forced to fight on one of the bloodiest battlefields of our times: the media. 69 
News Media
Providing a common arena for the different protagonists to face and challenge each other, the media contribute to and complete the framework of the internal forces interacting in the Kyoto Protocol process.
Understanding the press coverage of the ratification issues, however, requires a wider glance at the Russian media sector. Its position between state and market makes it an extremely peculiar system.
Russian media between state and market
For much of the 1990s, the development of independent media was considered a clear success of the Russian political transformation. The 1990 Law on the Press laid the legal foundation for the creation of print outlets independent from the state. The end of the state monopoly on media ownership gave journalists unprecedented freedom to criticise the authorities. A survey conducted in 1990 by the Commission for Freedom of Access to Information, a Russian NGO, showed that 70% of respondents relied on media reports 75 . New print and electronic media sprang up. While often led by brilliant and charismatic personalities, these "editorial collectives of journalists" lacked capable business managers.
As economic conditions worsened, journalists realized that the easiest way out of a difficult financial situation was either to seek government subsidies or look for investors among emerging businesses. The latter solution was preferred, and became increasingly popular in Moscow. The first business tycoons were indeed figuring out the political importance of the media for their interests.
The main tool of influence in a country as vast as Russia is of course television. At the end of 1993, the two channels with nation-wide reach, Channel One (Ostankino) and Channel Two (Russian Television) were both owned and managed by the state. In 1995, the Kremlin resolved to allow the privatisation of Channel One. The state maintained control over the newly created Public Russian Television (ORT) through various Russian agencies that held 51% of its shares; a consortium of banks and emerging industrial groups held the remaining 49%. Boris Berezovsky was the man behind the consortium and the ORT's largest single shareholder. He was a Kremlin insider and head of LogoVAZ, an industrial conglomerate based on a car dealership. Berezovsky, and his fellow media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky, were the first to understand the importance of media ownership to protect their other financial interests.
A turning-point for the Moscow-based media was marked by the 1996 presidential election. Yeltsin's candidacy appeared hopeless just six months before the election. The threat represented by the election victory of a Communist candidate, Gennadi Zyuganov, made it possible for privately owned media to join state-controlled outlets in supporting the re-election efforts of President Yeltsin. As Laura Belin argues, 75 Quoted in FOSSATO F., "The Russian Media: From Popularity to Distrust", in Current History, 100 (2001) 648 "even though no experimental data have proved that media coverage was the decisive factor in the 1996 election, it is an axiom in Russia that Yeltsin would not have won without the media's support 76 .
Yeltsin's re-election encouraged other financial and industrial groups to expand their media holdings. By the end of Yeltsin's second presidential term (1999), Berezovsky's media empire included control over television channels ORT and TV-6, 3 newspapers, including the relevant Kommersant, a number of weekly political, business and entertainment magazines. Announcing the creation of Gazprom Media in 1997, the gas monopoly Gazprom, which had provided informal financial support to some newspapers in the early 1990s, began to acquire shares in various print and electronic media. Gazprom also had a 30% stake in The newly created Federal Commission on Competitions for Television and Radio Broadcasting, controlled by the Media ministry, had power to concede and retire licensing for media. Though not at risk of losing its licence, NTV and its parent company, MediaMOST, came under increasing economic and political pressure beginning in June 1999, when a state-controlled bank demanded the holding repay a huge loan in cash.
Although that loan was repaid following a court battle, more pressure followed from Gazprom's chief executive, who criticised NTV's coverage of the war in Chechnya. The following month, Gazprom demanded reimbursement for a 211 million dollar loan it had repaid to a bank on MediaMOST's behalf. In part Media-MOST managers were to blame for their predicament, because they failed to create a media organization truly independent from the state. But ORT was not asked to repay its 100 million dollar loan from the same bank. Many observers state that the Internet is probably the least restricted communication means among the "managed pluralism" of media in Russia 82 . According to 2002 data, fewer than 10% of Russians use the Internet, and about 4% use it regularly (the world's average percentage of users does not reach 10%) 83 . 79 BELIN L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media", p. 333 80 "Freedom in the world 2004", in www.freedomhouse.org 81 BALZER H., "Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin's Emerging Regime", in Post-Soviet Affairs, 19 (2003) 4 82 See Ibidem, p. 203 83 MARCUS A., "The Internet in Putin's Russia. Reinventing a Technology of Authoritarianism", Oxford University, 2003 , in http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2003 . The paper is a well documented analysis on the Internet policy in Russia. The game theoretic model introduced to explain the Russian case shows that the promotion Table 1 shows the main Russian non-electronic media at June 2004. of Internet access and Information and Communication Technologies proliferation can be turned into direct and indirect propaganda.
Media coverage of the Kyoto Protocol Process
Statistical data and reports regarding the Russian media releases on the Kyoto treaty are not available in English. What can be found on the Internet are press reviews on environmental issues provided by political institutions 84 or environmental NGOs 85 . However, a simple searching on three popular newspapers, in their English version on the Internet, shows that the process which brought the Kyoto Protocol to Parliament for approval received a fair amount of attention.
The three newspapers were Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Pravda and The Moscow Times. The former two have an English version available on the web 86 , the latter is an English-language daily 87 . According to a 2002 survey, Gazeta.ru was the most visited Russian online media, while Pravda.ru occupied the eighth place.
Searching the archives of the English version for the occurrences of the string "Kyoto protocol" in the April
2002-June 2004 period (thus excluding the weeks immediately preceding the final decision by the Russian
Cabinet), results are as follows: for which Russia first applied in 1993, was mentioned respectively 4.3, 3.1 and 11.2 times a month: the gap floats from less than 2 to little more than 3 times. But WTO has recently been increasingly in the spotlight;
during last May a EU-Russia agreement was signed concluding the access negotiations that brought Russia Federation a long step closer to accession to the WTO.
Although quantitative data are merely partial, a content and sources' analysis overcomes this work's boundaries. According to many observers, however, keeping high pressure on the ratification issues in the local media is instrumental. "While apparently signalling intense internal debate, by raising the possibility of non-ratification it may well be a ploy to up the stakes on ratification 89 ". Given their tightly controlled nature, due to their property set-ups, the Russian media intervened in the political debate regarding the Kyoto Protocol in a peculiar way. Rather than a protagonist in it, they appeared to be a tool of the current negotiation policy.
CONCLUSIONS
In October 2004, Russia endorsed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which was signed by the country in 1997. This paper has analysed the influence groups that operate in the Russian political scene. We showed that no one of these, singularly taken, appears to be able to influence the ratification process' 89 Russia's decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol sent a strong signal for international climate policy, but was also widely criticised by domestic voices. Indeed, scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences had concluded that the Kyoto Protocol did not have the scientific substantiation. Russian academicians had analysed the possible consequences of the Kyoto Protocol's implementation on the Russian economy and advised that global warming would have several rather positive effects for Russia as the "coldest country in the world." According to the president's economic advisor, Andrey Illarionov, considered as the main critic of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia, the treaty is nothing than a "big lie" given the lack of authoritative scientific proof and the expected negative effect on Russia's economic growth induced by a reduced energy consumption 92 .
Given the complexities that we have highlighted related to the Russian internal forces, let us now try to identify the other main factors that have been decisive in inducing the country to bring the long-lasting ratification process to an end. President Putin has thus taken his decision based on motivations other than domestic ones. For this reason, we need to go beyond the rather "internal" vision on which we have focused until now, trying to highlight the incentives of the different groups, the driving forces prevailing in the country and the perspectives that would be realistic if the things were visualised only from inside of Russia.
Given this approach, the analysis has been abstracting from the various external forces that influence the process. These latter factors, and in particular political incentives related to Russia's economic perspectives, appear to have been decisive in inducing the country to bring the long-lasting ratification process to an end.
As has clearly emerged from the policy process, Russia has achieved a particularly relevant bargaining power in the Kyoto process after the US withdrawal and is using this increased negotiation position to obtain as many additional benefits as possible. Already at the COP 7 in Marrakech, Russia has been able to almost double its sink concessions and since this time various financial incentives have been set to induce Russia to co-operate. The last, most significant example of this strategy is represented by the deal confirming the connection between Russia's WTO entry and the Russian ratification: the European Union agreed to back Russia's bid to join the WTO by softening conditions on energy pricing, while President Putin said that he will speed up the process towards ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, though without any formal agreement. 93
The most important motivation for Russia's final decision seems thus to be the fact that the Russian administration strongly strives for Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization. In order to obtain support for Russia's WTO membership, Russia apparently was ready to bear several sacrifices. First, China's support was achieved by transferring them two islands in Russia's Far East. Then, Russia needed to take the hurdle of convincing the European Union. In order to provide support to Russia's WTO bid, in May 2004 the EU asked for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Although this statement induced several Russian politicians to start bargaining with the EU on different topics 94 , the Russian government chose to satisfy the EU request. Putin's decision clearly indicated that Russia's ratification is related to the provision of sufficient economic incentives and was thus particularly motivated by the potential positive financial consequences of the Kyoto Protocol's ratification 95 . This tendency was also visible through immediate reactions on the European carbon market, where Putin's statement has triggered some large-scale trading in emission credits by companies and countries 96 . The emphasis on financial incentives has also been reiterated after the Kremlin's announcement of Russia's ratification in late September, when experts suggested that Russia could earn up to 10 billion USD by developing a sales strategy and restricting supply of quotas to sell into the global emissions trading market 97 . The importance of participating in the international carbon market has also been confirmed by a recent statement by an official form the Russian Economy Ministry, according to which Russia is considering to set up a domestic emissions trading system that could be linked to the EU trading scheme, and a potential Canadian system, from the year 2008 98 .
In brief, Russia's decision is being widely seen as Moscow's strategy to benefit from emissions-quota trading and secure European Union support for its bid to enter the World Trade Organization. Russia's strategy can thus been considered as a type of "issue linkage" strategy, in which the country has decided to implements a type of "environment-for-trade" swap 99 . In order to reduce Russia's incentives to free-ride on 94 As reported by Pravda, the Russia politicians asked for example to write off the Russian state debt to the IMF and the Paris Club, having categorised it as the spending for the reduction of greenhouses gasses, which Russia achieved in 1990-2000. See http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/14495_kyoto.html 95 Several positive consequences of the Kyoto Protocol's ratification are expected. The most obvious one are the profits that Russia might gain by selling its excessive emission quotas in the international carbon market. Another possibility consists in foreign investments that Russia will have on account of power capacity and emission reduction projects. As reported by Pravda, investments in the field of public utilities, power engineering and timber industry will total some $2.5 billion. Issue linkage" has been proposed by both the economic and the political science literature on international environmental agreements as one of the main economic mechanisms able to increase participation in environmental cooperation. This policy strategy is based on the idea that countries may have incentives to free ride on a global public good (e.g. the environmental issue), but these incentives become much smaller if negotiations on the global public good are linked with negotiations on another economic issue (typically a club good whose benefits cannot be reaped by free-riders). See Carraro and Galeotti (2003) for a survey on incentive-based policy strategies and Buchner et al. (2002) for a discussion of issue linkage in the context of climate change control.
the climate issue -a typical public good problem -, negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol have indeed been linked to negotiations on economic issues. The linkage of cooperation on climate change control with cooperation on the entrance to the WTO has actually induced Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
From a rather Russia-internal vision, this paper's main findings provide some indications on the reasons of the recent developments. The governmental pattern in reforming and extending control over numerous spheres of public life, in fact, grants President Putin a conspicuous power. In addition, President Putin has recently implemented several actions regarding Russian institutions. Over the past six months, a structural reform of the governmental departments has been put into effect, a massive re-organisation of the energy sector has been undertaken and key industrial and media figures have come under criminal investigation.
Many observers see these developments as part of a strategy aimed at strengthening Kremlin power to the prejudice of other forces. Moreover, the overwhelming victories in both Parliamentary and Presidential elections secured President Putin a considerable political control. This, in turn, was able to determine the more resolute approach to the ratification issue that we have been able to observe during the final phase of the ratification process. At the internal level, indeed, the Kyoto ratification issue was increasingly in Putin's hands, as stressed also by his statement in the context of the WTO deal. The domestic influence groups that operate in the Russian political scene have clearly acted as pressure groups, as particularly the Russian energy sector, but the President plays the protagonist role.
The possibility of getting support for its WTO membership, obtainable only through cooperation on climate change control, has thus constituted a sufficient incentive for Russia to comply with the Kyoto targets. The
Russian adoption process of the Kyoto Protocol has thus proved to be meaningful even beyond the aspects strictly related to the international climate change policy as it offers a peculiar observation on the country and the difficult period of transformation it is dealing with. However, the analysis of the entire consequences of the Kyoto Protocol is still insufficient in Russia, as the topic has apparently mainly received attention for related political and economic issues. In the end, Russia has thus ratified the Kyoto Protocol due to its political importance, but without taking into account the whole range of possible implications.
